Inclusion and Autonomy: A study in belonging

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Introduction

We are social animals and we need to feel a sense of belonging, and yet independence is important to us and we would like to believe that we behave as individuals. This is the first premiss upon which this dissertation is based. The second is that belonging to a group precipitates a degree of ideological interpellation within the group members. I ask the question: how far is it possible to belong to a group and yet to retain autonomy of identity, autonomy of moral self-legislation, and ideological autonomy?

The ancient Greeks used the term ‘auto nomos’ to refer to a city-state outside the control of another city-state. Autonomy therefore meant independence and the ability to govern oneself without outside domination1. The Concise Oxford Dictionary takes autonomy to mean: ‘right of self government; personal freedom; freedom of the will’2. In this dissertation, I will therefore be using a broad definition of autonomy to refer to independence of thought or action. Bernard Berofsky raises Haworth’s idea that this must necessarily be a spectrum originating from ‘the manner in which we pass from totally dependent creatures to ones who are more or less equipped to operate independently and responsibly’3. I take belonging to mean an affirming identification with a group, be it a family group, a social circle, or enfranchised society.

I shall not assume that autonomy is necessarily desirable since this study concentrates primarily on how far it is possible, how it can be gained and what the consequences are, particularly in the context of group belonging. As to its desirability, Freud wrote of how ‘we

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are lived by unknown and uncontrollable forces, and yet argued that the aim of psychoanalysis is not to ‘abolish the possibility of morbid reactions, but to give the patient’s ego freedom to choose one way or the other’. Immanuel Kant described autonomy of the will as the foundation of human dignity and Jung saw what he termed ‘the development of consciousness out of the original state of identity’ as ‘the opus which leads to the goal: that is the goal of a lifetime’.

I have chosen to study autonomy of identity in Mervyn Peake’s Titus Alone, because by observing Titus’ struggle to define a separate identity in the absence of belonging to his home, I hope to show the effects which Gormenghast’s subjectifying group has had upon his sense of self. I also analyse Muzzlehatch’s social disenfranchisement and the manner in which this affects his identity. Titus Alone furthermore provides contexts of surveillance and categorisation within which to discuss the scope for autonomous identity within citizenship of a state. I selected Kevin Sampson’s novel Powder as the text within which to evaluate the autonomy of moral self-legislation, because it depicts extreme instances of transgression with few apparent psychological consequences for the protagonists. I decided to focus on a secondary character, James Love, since he exhibits the greatest moral autonomy. Finally, in order to assess the workings of ideological autonomy, I chose Jane Austen’s Emma. Emma credibly portrays a static society where ideological certainties seem strong, and in which social perceptions are very important in promoting conformity. With regard to Harriet, Emma and Knightley, I look at the implications for ideological autonomy of belonging to this group.

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5 Mausner, p. 8; ibid.
I shall also make occasional reference to Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* because I believe that Kurtz represents a useful archetype for the autonomous self.

Chapter 1: Autonomy of Identity in *Titus Alone*

Titus Groan reaches a position at the end of *Titus Alone* where he is able to draw back from seeing and returning to the castle, ‘Gormenghast’ where he grew up. It is enough for him that he recognises the boulder which, if he were to surmount, would grant him a glimpse of ‘the very stones and of the bridgeless spaces’\(^8\). On the threshold, he turns and walks away: ‘With every pace he drew away from Gormenghast Mountain, and from everything that belonged to his home’\(^9\). Up to this point, the novel and indeed the trilogy has dealt with the crisis of identity which Titus, who is ‘the seventy-seventh Earl of Gormenghast’\(^10\) and therefore successor to this gothic realm, has suffered upon confronting his heritage.

This then, is a moment of monumental significance within the epic world created by Mervyn Peake. *Titus Alone* explores questions of identity, asking how Titus can establish a self-sufficient identity in exile from his home: ‘How was it that they were so self-sufficient, those women in their cars, or Muzzlehatch with his zoo - Having no knowledge of Gormenghast, which was of course the heart of everything’\(^11\). Titus starts the novel in self-imposed exile having fled his Earldom and his duty. He travels strange lands and is described as having always ‘a general air of detachment ... His love was always elsewhere’\(^12\). Wherever Titus

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9 ibid., p. 263.  
11 ibid., pp. 28 - 29.  
12 ibid., p. 189.
finds himself, ‘Behind him, whenever he stood, or slept, were the legions of Gormenghast ... tier upon cloudy tier, with the owls calling though the rain, and the ringing of the rust-red bells’\textsuperscript{13}. The novel prompts us to question whether identity is self-constructed, whether a person is the sum-total of their background and experiences, a product of their nature and nurture, or whether their identity is best understood cumulatively by the perceptions of others.

Cut Loose: Identity Autonomous of Belonging

A minor character in the novel, Crabcalf, recites a poem from his ‘lifework’: ‘... How does the plantain sprout / Save by that root it cannot do without?’\textsuperscript{14} Crabcalf asks, ‘Do you see what I mean?’\textsuperscript{15} and three brief chapters later, we witness an impassioned soliloquy from Titus: ‘... I don’t belong. All I want is the smell of home, and the breath of the castle in my lungs. Give me some proof of me!’\textsuperscript{16} From this antithesis of autonomy, Titus reaches a point at the end of the trilogy whereby ‘He no longer had any need for home, for he carried his Gormenghast within him’\textsuperscript{17}. The other main character who gains autonomy of identity in \textit{Titus Alone} is Muzzlehatch. Muzzlehatch undergoes this process as he gradually loses all of his material possessions and emotional links to society: his ‘one-time lover’\textsuperscript{18} Juno, his animals, his protégé Titus, and then finally essentially everything:

He turned her to the precipice, and with a great heave sent her running upon her way. As she ran, the small ape leaped from his shoulders to the driver’s seat, and riding her like a little horseman plunged down the abyss.

\textsuperscript{13} id., p. 195.
\textsuperscript{14} id., p. 260.
\textsuperscript{15} id., p. 62.
Muzzlehatch becomes disenfranchised from society and cannot feel a sense of belonging, partly because he no longer has a vested interest in it, and he is under the impression that he has nothing left to lose.

Muzzlehatch finds that ‘All he could feel was a sense of liberation’\(^{20}\), yet as Muzzlehatch has floated free of all the associations which confine him, he has simultaneously lost the clues which define him. In *Emma*, Emma recognises the effect of visual codifiers upon identity when she compliments Mr. Knightley’s rare decision to come in a carriage: “‘There is always a look of consciousness or bustle when they come in a way which they know to be beneath them. You think you carry it off very well, I dare say, but with you it is a sort of bravado, an air of affected unconcern’”\(^{21}\). By this token, Muzzlehatch is disenfranchised from social belonging and dispossessed of the identity he derives of his accoutrements and relationships. His identity is subsequently irreparably disrupted and his sanity becomes questionable; this chain of events implicitly suggesting a link between the security provided by socially enfranchised identity and mental stability.

Like Kurtz in Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*, for Muzzlehatch there lies open the path of Kurtz’ freedom from social values; what Marlow responds to with the words: “‘He had kicked himself loose of the earth. Confound the man!’”\(^{22}\). Cut free and disenfranchised from any psychological investment in his environment, Muzzlehatch can kick “‘himself loose’” of civilised values as Kurtz did; Loose of “‘solid pavement under your feet, surrounded by kind neighbours ready to cheer you or to fall on you, stepping delicately between the butcher and the policeman, in the holy terror of scandal and gallows and lunatic asylums’”\(^{23}\). Away from

\(^{19}\) id., p. 158.
\(^{20}\) id., p. 159.
\(^{23}\) id., p. 49.
the trapeze act of parochial civilised values and their subjectifying reminders, there are no checks or balances for the exiled self in Conrad’s Africa - and there can be no threat of scandal, no definition of madness which will hold weight with Muzzlehatch. He has nothing at stake and has entered a psychological realm where, as the Manager’s uncle tells his ambitious nephew, “Anything - anything can be done in this country”24. By the time of Muzzlehatch’s last appearance, Titus can see ‘at a glance how Muzzlehatch was bent upon death: that he was deranged’25, by observing the ‘lethal light in the gaunt man’s eyes’26.

Purging the Old Signifiers

Titus’ struggle for autonomy of identity must necessarily be linked to a struggle to free himself from yearning after his home, and until he is no longer dependent upon the subjectifying semiotics of his background for affirmation of his identity, he cannot be said to be autonomous. The power of Gormenghast castle’s strong ingroup mentality to impose identity through the sheer weight of its tradition is visualised in a prophetic dream which Juno has before the barbecue, in which she sees Titus ‘staggering with a castle on his back’27. Gormenghast represents a cohesive community founded upon a rigidly hierarchical hereditary tradition where role subjectifies identity; and as Berry observed of the Temne people of Sierra Leone28, interdependence promotes consensus and heteronomy. Steerpike, initially a kitchen boy, is expected to share in the collective joy at the birth of a male heir: the Earl’s first servant Flay demands of Steerpike, ‘What! no Great Happiness? Rebellion. Is it

24 id., p. 34.
26 id., p. 239.
27 id., p. 212.
rebellion?’. 29 One of the reasons that Titus decided to leave the castle was to escape his father’s fate of having the definition of his identity forced upon him by Gormenghast’s ritual: for the young Titus, ‘Even to lose himself was to be lost with that other child, that symbol, that phantom, the seventy-seventh Earl of Gormenghast who hovered at his elbow’ 30. Sapir asserts that ‘society’ is merely a word which ‘helps certain people to understand their role’ 31, but in a community like Gormenghast’s, role is identity - witness how, ‘Through daily proximity to the great slabs of stone, the faces of the Grey Scrubbers had become like slabs themselves’ 32. As Taylor suggests, it is the ‘unitary nature’ 33 of Gormenghast which threatens to leave Titus’ identity incomplete when he leaves.

Since his flight from the castle, Titus has ‘carried with him’ 34 a ‘small knuckle of flint’ 35 in his pocket. This is a fragment of his home and he clings compulsively to it ‘as though to prove to himself that his boyhood was real, and that the Tower of Flints still stood as it had stood for centuries, out-topping all the masonry of his ancient home’ 36. The Tower of Flints is significant in a number of ways: in that it is the most prominent tower of Gormenghast; in that Titus’ father was killed there 37 - ‘eaten by owls’ 38 and arguably in that it is a phallic symbol at the centre of a patriarchal realm:

Over their irregular roofs would fall throughout the seasons, the shadows of time-eaten buttresses, of broken and lofty turrets, and, most enormous of all, the shadow of the Tower of Flints. This tower, patched unevenly with black ivy, arose like a mutilated finger from among the fists of knuckled masonry and pointed blasphemously at heaven. 39

30 30 Peake, Gormenghast, pp. 332 - 333.
32 32 Peake, Titus Groan, p. 28.
33 33 Taylor, Other Worlds, D/1320 (Lancaster: Lancaster University Dissertation), p. 92.
34 34 Peake, Alone, p. 11
35 35 ibid.
36 36 id.
37 37 Peake, Titus Groan, p. 441.
38 38 Peake, Alone, p. 78.
39 39 Peake, Groan, p. 15.
This penis which ‘point[s] blasphemously at heaven’ and is a focal point for noisy nocturnal activity - ‘At night the owls made of it an echoing throat’ - is a part of Titus’ birthright and inheritance as the male heir, and a symbol of his phallocentric authority. When Titus loses his flint, its instrumentality in anchoring his identity becomes evident in his devastation: “And I forgot my flint. And without my flint I am lost ... And the proof of it is only proof for me. It is no proof of anything to anyone but me.” Without this material and symbolic codifier of his old identity, Titus is freed to begin constructing a new subjectivity.

In terms of his sexual identity, the loss of Titus’ ‘small knuckle of flint’ immediately after the end of his first sexual relationship with a mother-figure - Juno, the large lady who thinks of Titus as “My child from Gormenghast. My Titus Groan” - can be regarded as a metaphorical castration of his pre-pubescent identification with his mother, an inverted operation of the ‘Oedipal’ scenario. He no longer belongs with his mother or with mother-figures, and by losing this material link with the home, is able to move on to other psychological stages of sexual identity.

The struggle for an autonomous identity which might give Titus a sense of belonging or at the least reduce his feeling of exile from the self, is a journey which culminates in Cheeta’s barbecue. Thwarted and snubbed by Titus in her desire for control over him and driven by anger and revenge, Cheeta organises a gathering at which she recreates a monstrous sham Gormenghast from the outpouring of details she had garnered during Titus’ feverish delirium. Its focus is a procession of mechanised caricatures of the characters of Gormenghast. The party is ultimately disrupted and Cheeta screams, “Dismantle them!” ... for she saw out-

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40 id.  
42 id., p. 11.  
43 id., p. 90.  
topping the crowd, the battered masks, the hanks of hair; the Countess breaking in half, dusty and ludicrous; the sawdust; and the paint. The farewell party which the scientist’s daughter organises in order to psychologically torture Titus serves paradoxically as a catharsis - a painful one, but a purgation nonetheless of signifiers. Cheeta plays mind games with Titus, confusing the boundaries between reality and illusion, memories and dreams. In the process, she effectively traps Titus in the nightmare revelations of Derrida and Baudrillard by denying his autonomy of self-definition in the context of endless simulacra. Titus is made to feel that the symbols which constitute him and validate his truths only take him further from reality:

“A farewell from his old self to his new. How splendid! To tear one’s throne up by the roots, and fling it to the floor. What was it after all but a symbol? We have too many symbols. We wade in symbols. We are sick of them ... His head is no longer anything but an emblem. His heart is a cypher. He is a mere token. But we love him, don’t we?”

As Derrida writes in *Of Grammatology*, ‘The supplement is always the supplement of a supplement. One wishes to go back from the supplement to the source: one must recognise that there is a supplement at the source’. The self-referentiality of signification is developed by Baudrillard who opens *Simulacra and Simulation* by quoting Ecclesiastes: “The simulacrum is never what hides the truth - it is truth that hides the fact that there is none. The simulacrum is true”. In consequence, the potential for a *jouissance* of original signification is endlessly deferred because the real has been superseded as ‘that which is always already reproduced’. This simulated Gormenghast debases the authoritative reality of the original and so provides for Titus a chance to become autonomous of his past. All that Titus passionately associates with Gormenghast is depicted to him as a precession of

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46 *id.*, p. 237.
47 *id.*, pp. 248 - 249.
48 *id.*, p. 231.
simulacra, ‘pasteboard travesties’; and he is left with ‘an absolute emptiness’. The novel suggests that in recognising the hollowness of the signifiers which subjectify him and thereby laying them to rest, Titus will be able to define a more autonomous identity.

Surveillance and Evading Categorisation

The modern city in *Titus Alone* is built upon panoptic principles. Titus comes across a vast circular marble arena, around which are arranged the buildings - ‘fantasies of glass and metal’. In this surveillance culture, the architecture and layout of this city presumably insures - as Bentham’s *Panopticon* foresaw - that ‘Visibility is a trap’. Julius remarked upon this development of the state, ‘towards that great aim the building and distribution of buildings intended to observe a great multitude of men at the same time’. The narrator of *Titus Alone* explains how, seen from above, it could ‘be realised ... how bizarre and ingenious’ the arena ‘with its bright circumference of crystal buildings’ was; and ‘how unrelated it was to ... the tracts beyond of the wolf and the outlaw’. This environment in itself challenges the autonomy of those in it, mirroring the effect which Foucault recognises of the Panopticon: ‘to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power’. In the modern city of surveillance in *Titus Alone*, ‘To walk across it, in view of all the distant windows, terraces, and roof-gardens was to proclaim...”

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53 Peake, *Alone*, p. 255
54 id.
55 id., p. 32.
57 id.
58 id., p. 478
59 Peake, *Alone*, p. 34. Also, subsequent quotations in this sentence.
arrogance, naked and culpable’\textsuperscript{61}. Titus becomes especially self-conscious when a ‘small green dart’\textsuperscript{62} swoops past and around him in reconnaissance: ‘something that told him that to stay any longer on this marble tract was to court trouble, to be held a vagrant, a spy, or a madman’\textsuperscript{63}.

Titus and Muzzlehatch do not fit in, they do not belong. Titus is the foreign Earl of a realm which nobody has heard of; Muzzlehatch is an eccentric, the ‘intellectual ruffian who sat astride the stag like some ravaged god’\textsuperscript{64} and ‘whose every movement was a kind of stab in the bosom of the orthodox world’\textsuperscript{65}. By evading inclusive categorisation and resisting a predictability of definition, both Titus and Muzzlehatch avoid being told what they are. They avoid having their identities circumscribed and expectations ascribed to their behaviour.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote, ‘My own words take me by surprise and teach me what I think’\textsuperscript{66} and I would argue that a tendency of categorisation as a process, and thus of expectation, is for other people’s words to take one by surprise and alter how one behaves.

As the contemporary philosopher Simon Blackburn interprets Hegel, our identities are shaped by the perceptions of others: ‘Our consciousness of ourselves is largely or even essentially a consciousness of how we stand for other people. We need stories of our own value in the eyes of each other, the eyes of the world’\textsuperscript{67}. To evade categorisation is therefore to pre-empt the moulding capacity of social typecasting upon identity.

Titus’ failure to belong to familiar systems of signs and categories is incidental, by virtue of his foreignness. He makes his début to high society in the foreign city by accidentally

\textsuperscript{61}Peake, \textit{Alone}, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{62}id.
\textsuperscript{63}id., p. 35.
\textsuperscript{64}id., p. 26.
\textsuperscript{65}id., pp. 219 - 220.
crashing through a skylight\textsuperscript{68} ‘dressed half in rags and half in livery’\textsuperscript{69}. One guest tries to help him by shifting the significance of his clothes: ‘good Heavens - you misconstrue the rags. He is in fancy dress\textsuperscript{70} and he is eventually held and questioned at length to no avail: ‘“An enigma,” said the Inspector. / “I don’t agree,” said Lady Cusp-Canine. “He is only a boy”’\textsuperscript{71}. Muzzlehatch foresees the difficulty which Titus will present to the rigid classifications of the state: “‘They’ll find him difficult ... very difficult. Rather like a form of me. It is more a case of what will he do to \textit{them}’”\textsuperscript{72}.

Surveillance can be said to deprive the subject of autonomous control over their own identity. Surveillance categorises, renames and classifies in the language of the state; it then imposes this order back on the citizen through legislation and therefore law enforcement - Inspector Acreblade: “I have a warrant for his arrest as a vagrant; an alien; and undesirable”\textsuperscript{73}; through judicial process - “It \textit{was},” said the Clerk of the Court. “Vagrancy, damage and trespass”\textsuperscript{74}; and through incarceration - “Let that last you till the morning, you bloody whelp!” shouted the warder\textsuperscript{75}. If the perceptions of others can be said frequently to influence one’s self-image, affirming or eroding one’s identity, then one consequence of increased surveillance and the proliferation of the state’s panoptic gaze, must surely be to induce a crisis of autonomous identity. In the courtroom, Titus is buffeted by semiotic conflict. The Magistrate informs him, ‘Your ways are curious, your terms are meaningless’\textsuperscript{76} and Titus’ own self-definition is rejected - like a made-up word, Titus is told, ‘you are rootless and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{68}Peake, \textit{Alone}, chapter twenty-five, p. 50.
\item \textsuperscript{69}ib., p. 62.
\item \textsuperscript{70}ib., p. 53.
\item \textsuperscript{71}ib., p. 63.
\item \textsuperscript{72}ib., pp. 65 - 66.
\item \textsuperscript{73}ib., p. 53
\item \textsuperscript{74}ib., p. 76.
\item \textsuperscript{75}ib., p. 74.
\item \textsuperscript{76}ib., p. 77.
\end{itemize}
obtuse’ and asked, ‘What is this Gormenghast? What does it mean?’ In consequence, Titus is prompted by contact with the state’s gaze to question his own propriety and integrity: ‘What do you want of me? I am sick of it all! Sick of being followed. What have I done wrong - save to myself? So my papers are out of order, are they? So is my brain and heart.

It is significant also that in his impulse to immediately destroy a spherical surveillance device, Titus throws his flint at it. At this point, he runs away, losing the flint. This could be read as Titus losing some of his identity to surveillance and Titus attempts here to kill both categorisation by the state, and categorisation by his history, with one flint - in his bid for autonomy of identity.

Chapter 2: Autonomy of Moral Self-Legislation in Powder

Powder, first published in 1999, has the full title Powder: An everyday story of rock ‘n’ roll folk. Kevin Sampson, the former manager of Liverpool band The Farm, has written the fictional story of an indie group - the Grams - who rise to success from anonymity. The Grams achieve world-wide fame and the band members gain recognition and wealth. By the end of the book, the band has changed, it has reportedly split up - or given up - on its gruelling US tour, but its story is no longer of real interest for their former record company executive and supporter, Guy deBurret: “Wheezy! Hey, listen man, bad one! Willard’s pulled out. Yeah. No - blown the whole thing. Dunno. Dunno. They just lost it apparently ... who cares? Listen. Can you get down here, pronto? I have a minor proposition for you ...”

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77 [id.]
78 [id., p. 85.]
The drive of the narrative is the prolific rise to stardom of four unknown Liverpudlians, and as such the novel follows the Fool’s words of advice to Kent in *King Lear*: ‘Let go thy hold when a great wheel runs down a hill, lest it break thy neck with following it; but the great one that goes up the hill, let him draw thee after’\(^8^0\). The Grams’ star is in the ascendant and after they are unexpectedly mobbed and groped by a riot of frenzied fans on entering a hometown venue, then carried to safety by bouncers, the group feel that, as of now ‘‘we four boys can do WHAT THE FUCK WE WANT!’’\(^8^1\).

Blackburn describes the effects which he believes that our ‘moral or ethical environment’\(^8^2\) has upon us:

> This is the surrounding climate of ideas about how to live. It determines what we find acceptable or unacceptable, admirable or contemptible. It determines our conception of when things are going well and when they are going badly. ... It shapes our emotional responses, determining what is a cause of pride or shame, or anger or gratitude, or what can be forgiven and what cannot. It gives us our standards - our standards of behaviour.\(^8^3\)

If we would like to believe that we are engaged in what Jung referred to as a process of individuation\(^8^4\), or that we should strive to think and act as individuals, then we should surely be determining the above standards for ourselves. This would require moral self-legislation in the Kantian sense. In *Autonomy and self-respect*, Hill refers to Kant’s stipulation that an ideally autonomous moral self-legislator ‘should not be moved by blind adherence to tradition or authority, by outside threats or bribes, by unreflective impulse, or unquestioned habits of thought’\(^8^5\).

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\(^8^1\) Sampson, *Powder*, p. 289.


\(^8^3\) id., p. 2.


\(^8^5\) Hill, *Autonomy and self-respect*, p. 45.
Heterodoxy: Beyond Moralising Discourse

Hector Lovett, the lead guitarist, styles himself as James Love and lives the rock ‘n’ roll lifestyle to the exhaustion of all of its clichés, adding some original sins of his own. James has sex with Madeleine, the nineteen-year-old daughter of the barmaid at Ye Cracke and then, at the mother’s instigation, has sex with them both in turn. Shortly afterwards, he remembers seeing them as he left, ‘mother and daughter still held each other, stroking the other’s hair’ and we are told that ‘This disturbed James more than anything he could imagine’. He is, ‘for once, stunned’ and is nearly run over by a van in his dislocated state.

As a result of his first significant narrated transgression of social norms, James does not apparently undergo the repercussions of internalised guilt mechanisms and it is his bloody-minded will to violate social correctness which negates the possibility of his feeling guilt for his actions:

Doing it to them, with the drugs and the booze and all the wrongness of it, felt, to James, fantastic. It was the best. But when he stopped there was nothing to say, nothing to linger over. He wasn’t ashamed - but he couldn’t stay. He wanted out. Seeing them there, so close like that just brought his low on bad.

James relishes the ‘wrongness’ of his actions and as such he pre-empts socialising or normative influences.

However, he is not immune to being disturbed by the physical reality of the Real of his Desire. After his initial mother and daughter transgression, James Love tries to sleep but finds his consciousness assailed by images: ‘He couldn’t sleep. His closed eyes only called up nightmarish sexual fantasies, fantasies he knew could be real to him’. I would propose that James’ subconscious desire is surfacing in his stunned, drugged, hungover, post-coital...

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86 Sampson, Powder, p. 152. Also, subsequent two quotations.
87 id., p. 151.
88 id., p. 152.
89 id., p. 153.
daze; That James is making contact with what Lacan calls the Real of our Desire\textsuperscript{90} from beneath his post-‘mirror stage’\textsuperscript{91} assumption of ‘the armour of an alienating identity’\textsuperscript{92}. These sexual fantasies represent ‘the dream-work’\textsuperscript{93} of James’ id, the repressed narratives of the unconscious mind. In \textit{The Plague of Fantasies}\textsuperscript{94}, Zizek refers to ‘the seven veils of fantasy’\textsuperscript{95} as our world as it is constructed by our dreams; and in \textit{The Sublime Object of Ideology}\textsuperscript{96}, Zizek writes: ‘in our everyday, waking reality we are \textit{nothing but a consciousness of this dream}’\textsuperscript{97}. Since our fantasy-construct is the frame through which our personality and our notions of identity are externalised, our fantasy-construct ‘determines our activity, our mode of acting in reality itself’, Zizek submits. In Zizek’s formulation, both fantasy and ideology serve to promote the waking dream which shelters us from our Lacanian Real, and thus it is that he claims that ‘the only way to break the power of our ideological dream is to confront the Real of our desire’. By confronting and exercising his repressed Real, James Love is able to exorcise the hold which ideologies of repression and conformity have over him.

Like Kurtz in \textit{Heart of Darkness}, James has ‘“kicked himself loose of the earth’’\textsuperscript{98} and been drawn by hedonism as Kurtz was by the African wilderness: it has ‘“beguiled his unlawful soul beyond the bounds of permitted aspirations”’\textsuperscript{99}. James now appears to be beyond the interpellative hailing of wider society. Assaulted by the verbal battery of the enraged van driver, ‘“You stupid cunt! You didn’t even f**kin look! ...”’ James simply ‘looked at him’,

\textsuperscript{90}Rivkin and Ryan, ‘“Strangers to Ourselves”’, p. 123.
\textsuperscript{92}Ibid., p181.
\textsuperscript{93}Ibid.: p131.
\textsuperscript{95}Ibid. Part 1, chapters 1 - 7.
\textsuperscript{97}id., p324. Also subsequent two quotations.
\textsuperscript{98}Conrad, \textit{Heart of Darkness}, p. 65.
\textsuperscript{99}id.
and faced with this behaviour, the driver backs away: "‘Fucken smacked-out gobshite! Get your head together!’"\(^{100}\). James’ flagrantly transgressive behaviour reinforces his sense of autonomous isolation from everyday categories, and it insulates him from normative influence. As Marlow confronts in Kurtz, this flagrant defiance of norms bewilders mainstream value systems - "‘I has to deal with a being to whom I could not appeal in the name of anything high or low’"\(^{101}\) - and leaves a vacuum of socialising discourse: "‘Confound the man!’"\(^{102}\). Thus it is that James finds that discourse is ineffectual - ‘He didn’t know how he felt about it. He felt nothing’\(^{103}\) - and language is inadequate: ‘He spoke calmly to the driver, who was still pointing and cursing at him. ‘‘You’ll never see half the things I’ve seen’’\(^{104}\).

The figure of Kurtz in *Heart of Darkness* is an important literary beacon of autonomy because he represents in Andreas’ words ‘a non-conformist so powerful that he makes whole societies swerve, even though ever so slightly, from their orbits’\(^{105}\). In his book, *Joseph Conrad: A study in non-conformity*, Andreas puts forward the view that for the mixed-nationality Conrad, ‘this story was his personal declaration of independence from that centripetal force in society which tends to make conformists of us all’\(^{106}\). Just as Marlow confronts Kurtz and experiences a profound disorientation in his value systems - "‘He was alone - and I before him did not know whether I stood on the ground or floated in the air’"\(^{107}\) - Titus in *Gormenghast* confronts the ‘Thing’\(^{108}\) - his estranged foster sister - and finds his social values thrown wildly out of orbit: ‘She had shown him by her independence how it

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100\(^{100}\) Sampson, *Powder*, p. 153.
101\(^{101}\) Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*, p. 65.
102\(^{102}\) Id.
103\(^{103}\) Sampson, *Powder*, p. 151.
104\(^{104}\) Id., p. 153.
106\(^{106}\) Id., p. 194.
was only fear that held people together. The fear of being alone and the fear of being different. Her unearthly arrogance and self-sufficiency had exploded at the very centre of his conventions\(^{109}\). Equally, James Love finds that contact with a shocking heterodox gives him a sense of liberating insight and deprives his previous perceptions of their validity and their hold upon him. His behaviour is similar to Marlow’s who, having come close enough to hear the whisper of “‘The horror! The horror!’”\(^{110}\), finds it hard to belong upon his return to the “‘sepulchral city’”\(^{111}\). “‘I tottered about the streets - there were various affairs to settle - grinning bitterly at perfectly respectable persons. I admit my behaviour was inexcusable’”\(^{112}\).

Like Muzzlehatch, whose leeward nonconformity leads him to infiltrate the interior of a genocidal factory\(^{113}\), such glimpses “‘beyond the bounds of permitted aspirations’”\(^{114}\) can derange autonomous characters and compromise their capacity for belonging. The validity of socialising discourses of right behaviour is undermined, and social morality is denuded of absolute truth and informational influence, by experience of a heterodox Other.

Pre-Empting Shame

James indulges a fetish for crippled girls. This is by no means morally wrong. However, James’ sexual fixation is likely to be seen as morally dubious, and stigmatised as unnatural or unhealthy by at least a part of society. In constituting sexuality, our society defines beauty and commodifies sexual attractiveness in terms of physical perfection and wholeness. A ‘fetish’ for the physically disabled will tend to become categorised as a perversion of

\(^{109}\) Id., pp. 506 - 507.
\(^{110}\) Conrad, Heart of Darkness, p. 68.
\(^{111}\) Id., p. 70.
\(^{112}\) Id.
\(^{113}\) Peake, Alone, p. 220
\(^{114}\) Conrad, Heart of Darkness, p. 65.
socially-channelled, endorsed sexual desire; and therefore the instigator may be maligned as a deviant or excluded as a pervert. Nonetheless, James asserts his will. The girl he sees at the front of a London gig audience draws his attention: ‘Her hands were deformed as with those of the victims of fertility drugs and her body was childlike. But James was entranced’. He arranges for her to receive aftershow clearance and later snorts cocaine off her naked body before having intercourse with her.

Subsequently, in San Francisco, amid the post-performance revelries, we abruptly read that ‘James noticed she had only one leg’ and ‘He moved to sit by her immediately’. By this stage, his sexual fixation has matured and he feels confident about his desire: ‘James wasn’t sure about the false familiarity and the coy act, but he was certain about the tumult in his pants’. Later in the tour, in LA, James deliberately sets out to confront and confound social expectations for propriety. He is speaking with three girls, but is particularly interested in the girl in a wheelchair with severe facial burns and a voice box. The girl assumes, assenting, that James doesn’t ‘give a fuck about getting to know me. You want to fuck me. You want to know how bad my tits are burned. You want to know what it’s like to fuck a girl with a voice box ...’. James subverts this expectation, saying ‘“I don’t want to know, really, what it’s like to shag someone with a voice box. That’d be to defeat the real object, wouldn’t it?”’, and the girls are lost for words, ‘waiting for some unexpected revelation of humanity from the self-satisfied guitarist’. James outdoes himself, exhibiting an apparent obliviousness to shame: ‘“No. I wanna know if it gets clogged up when you swallow ...”’.

James has anal sex with the disabled girl with the voice box having consensually dragged her down a hotel corridor to the room he is sharing with a friend. There is an air of boisterous gasconade about his interjection into his room-mate’s anecdote the next morning, ‘“I’m

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115 Sampson, Powder, p. 269.
116 id., p. 273.
117 id., p. 365. Also subsequent two quotations.
telling you, man, I had to fucken whop it in, tight as fuck like, but I thought I’d burst a bag of farts when I fucken got it up there! Waft! It was like a blowback from a methane tank! I had to keep me ‘ead back over me shoulder while I was, like, obliging her ...’\textsuperscript{119}. Being this explicit, James must expect to draw opprobrium even from a reference group which includes his fellow band member, the bassist Tony Snow - ‘“You’re sick,” muttered Tony. “You’re a very sick boy, Hector’\textsuperscript{120} - and the manner in which he sets out to offend demonstrates James Love’s contempt for the ideology of shame, having seemingly discarded and disregarded the indictment of any reference groups.

Transgressive Belonging

James Love surrounds himself with the bohemian reference group of a transgressive sub-culture even during his years in Liverpool - he is know to ‘Liverpool’s dealers and touts’\textsuperscript{121} and he aspires to the rock ‘n’ roll lifestyle with like-minded musicians. The rock ‘n’ roll lifestyle is distinguished by the lawyer Tony Wolfe in \textit{Powder} partly by its subversion of formal - and legal - categories: ‘Defamation was difficult to prove in any case, but in the case of rock stars, who openly courted controversy ... it was going to be very difficult’\textsuperscript{122}. As the Grams’ success and their entourage grows, encompassing debauchery of a Bacchanalian pitch, James becomes more insulated from the possibility of contact with less liberal referent informational influence groups and comes also to derive his sense of belonging from his immediate circle, as Sherif and Sherif typify within a sociological context:

To the extent that the individual derives a sense of belongingness and a sense of being somebody to be counted though his membership in the group, the group increasingly becomes the source of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[118]{id., p. 405. Also subsequent three quotations.}
\footnotetext[119]{id., p. 408.}
\footnotetext[120]{id.}
\footnotetext[121]{id., p. 151.}
\footnotetext[122]{id., p. 327.}
\end{footnotes}
Simultaneously then, James is gaining the confidence to engage in moral self-legislation, exorcising the repressed Real of his id’s Desire, and gaining increasing affirmation from his burgeoning circle. These developments further his transgressive autonomy from the normative influence of shame, from the confining ideology of a moral ‘conscience’ and from the referent informational influence of guilt. By the time the wheel of the Grams reaches Saturnalian heights, James therefore appears beyond the influence of shame, of Freud’s ‘morbid reactions’\textsuperscript{124}, and beyond the influence of guilt.

By ‘openly [courting] controversy’\textsuperscript{125}, James defiantly pre-empts the excise of shame. Having telephoned two of his fellow Grams the previous night to make them listen to him having sex - and hear a young girls voice, “‘Save some for me, Jamie. Mum. Save some for me’”\textsuperscript{126} - James boasts the next day of “‘Mother and Daughter Act. Number Two. Could’ve had untold Sister Acts, but it’s old hat an’ that, that, innit?’”\textsuperscript{127}. James has found a group within which he can feel belonging despite or even because of successively transgressive acts of nonconformity. Upon hearing of James’ conquests, Keva - the singer and frontman - ‘grimaced and smiled to himself’, whilst their manager, Wheezer, ‘shook his head admiringly’. If James needs affirmation and a ‘sense of belongingness’\textsuperscript{128}, he has found in membership of the Grams, the reference group to provide it without, for his purposes, placing serious restraints upon his moral autonomy.

\textsuperscript{124} Mausner, \textit{Psychoanalytic Theory of Will}, Unpublished, p.8; but quoted here from Berofsky, \textit{Liberation from Self}, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{125} Sampson, \textit{Powder}, p. 327.
\textsuperscript{126} \textit{id.}, p. 440. Also, subsequent three quotations.
\textsuperscript{127} \textit{id.}
\textsuperscript{128} Sherif and Sherif, \textit{Reference Groups}, p. 251.
Chapter 3: Ideological Autonomy in *Emma*

Louis Althusser saw ideology as representing ‘the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence’\(^{129}\). Where Althusser described how ideology interpellates individuals as ‘always-already’\(^{130}\) subjects; Mikhail Bakhtin had written of the dialogic interrelationships between our own internally persuasive discourse and ‘prior’\(^{131}\) authoritative discourses, and between our own discourse and others’: ‘Our ideological development is just such an intense struggle within us for hegemony among various available verbal and ideological points of view, approaches, directions and values\(^{132}\). I examine ideological autonomy within this framework.

Autonomy from Class Prejudice

Within the context of a society founded upon class prejudice, Mr. Knightley is most successful at achieving autonomy from such prejudice at relatively little social cost. He fraternises with the Coles, in particular Mr. Cole, despite the fact that they ‘were of low origin, in trade, and only moderately genteel’\(^{133}\); he enjoys the company\(^{134}\) of his servant William Larkins and he lauds the virtues of the farmer Robert Martin. William Larkins is the only servant to be mentioned by his full name in *Emma*, and Knightley gives him this honour every time he is referred to. Whereas Emma attempts to dismiss Robert Martin for not being


\(^{130}\) Id., p. 300.


\(^{132}\) Id., p. 44.

\(^{133}\) Austen, *Emma*, p. 171.
possessed of the semiotics of "gentility" - "I had no idea that he could be so very clownish, so totally without air" - Knightley builds a friendship with his neighbour on grounds of respect for his character: "He knows I have a thorough regard for him and all his family, and, I believe, considers me as one of his best friends ... I never hear better sense from any one than Robert Martin". Knightley responds to the calibre of Robert Martin’s character by saying, "His rank in society I would alter if I could; which is saying a great deal I assure you" - which both reinforces prejudiced class values, and yet expresses a dissatisfaction with the system itself. Knightley’s real achievement is to have made lasting friendships with those supposedly "inferior" to him, in a social context which discourages it: "You laugh at me about William Larkins; but I could quite as ill spare Robert Martin." Although Emma thinks Knightley’s behaviour odd, he suffers no serious social consequences.

In *Emma*, certain group tenets seem much harder to think or act outside of. There is a prevailing prejudice against gypsies - the ‘outgroup’ of disenfranchised Others against which society defines itself. The Knightley’s children love to hear ‘the story of Harriet and the gypsies’ with its clear-cut characterisations of villains, damsel and hero. Even Emma - the grown ‘imaginist’ - romanticises the incident as an ‘adventure’ involving ‘a fine young man and a lovely young woman thrown together’ and for the growing children, the attraction of the story perhaps stems from what Halm refers to as the aspect of ‘self-and-

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134 id., pp. 212 - 213.
135 id., p. 29.
136 id., p. 52.
137 id., p. 54.
138 id., p. 387.
139 id., p. 387.
140 id., p. 387.
141 Hogg and Vaughan, *Social Psychology*, p. 221.
143 id., p. 277.
144 id.
world definition inherent in cultural representations. One trait of human nature which Austen’s *Emma* suggests through its patterns of self-delusion and epiphany is that we are all wont to tell ourselves fairy-tales; and like the Knightley children we cling faithfully to this imposed order in the context of ‘the inchoate formlessness and irrepressible multiplicity of phenomena’: ‘still tenaciously setting her right if she varied in the slightest particular from the original recital’.

In a society indoctrinated with this oppositional identity from an early age, it is little wonder that neither Harriet nor her school friend Miss Bickerton have the ideological autonomy to adjust their preconceptions to the reality of meeting some gipsies. Both women feel immediately threatened and panic, despite there being no evidence of threatening behaviour ever having ‘occurred before to any young ladies in the place’ or indeed occurring before them at present: ‘all clamorous, and impertinent in look, though not absolutely in word’. Freud recognised the ‘relationship between autonomy and adjustment’ which Adorno qualifies with the words, ‘I still consider it the obligation and at the same time the proof of mature individuality to transcend mere adjustment’. Here, Harriet and Miss Bickerton neither transcend expedient ‘mere adjustment’ to social norms, nor adjust their preconceptions to incorporate experiential discrepancies.

**Marrying ‘Below’ Oneself**

146 id.
147 Austen, *Emma*, p. 278.
148 id., p. 277.
149 id., p. 276.
151 id., pp. 338 - 9.
Whereas Miss Churchill marries below herself to Captain Weston out of conviction in her love for him and is unhappy, Harriet Smith is perceived to marry her inferior Robert Martin out of love and is expected by the objective Mr. Knightley to be very happy. The difference is that Miss Churchill did not have conviction enough to sustain self-belief in her own choice: ‘She had resolution enough to pursue her own will in spite of her brother, but not enough to refrain from unreasonable regrets at that brother’s unreasonable anger, nor from missing the luxuries of her own home.’ As a consequence of pursuing her autonomous will, Miss Churchill loses the affirmation of her parents ‘who threw her off with due decorum’ and ‘her brother and his wife’, but yet - the narrator tells us - ‘Mrs. Weston ought to have found more [happiness] in it’. She falls victim to outside representations of her situation in the same way that in Dickens’ *Hard Times*, Mr Bounderby’s perceptions are influenced by Mrs Sparsit: ‘Now, these persistent assuagements of his misery, and lightenings of his load, had by this time begun to have the effect of making Mr Bounderby softer than usual towards Mrs Sparsit, and harder than usual to most other people from his wife downward’. Mrs. Weston similarly becomes persuaded to think of herself as having been hard done by, when she allows reference group perceptions to overwhelm her own reality of her husband’s ‘warm heart and sweet temper’. Thus an over reliance upon informational influence at the expense of autonomous internally persuasive discourse is liable to lead to inauthentic responses, whereas Harriet’s trust in her own judgement promotes more sincere emotional responses in her behaviour.

Harriet is impressionable and is interpellated by Emma with relative ease, into adopting ideas of social superiority and also of her own superiority to Robert Martin: “There can be no
doubt of your being a gentleman’s daughter, and you must support your claim to that station”157. She is influenced by Emma into believing that she is in love with Mr. Elton: “‘No, indeed, Miss Woodhouse, you need not be afraid; I can sit and admire him now without any great misery.’”158. Yet when Harriet is sent away from Emma to Brunswick Square, she is soon able to revive her original affections for Robert Martin and accept his marriage proposal, despite its implications for her social status and her friendship with Emma. Harriet has moved from a position of conforming to Hartfield’s class prejudices and thereby finding solace in Emma’s patronage, from saying “‘No, I hope I know better than to think of Robert Martin’”159 and believing of Emma that “‘Nobody is equal to you!’”160, to rejecting Emma’s privilege, prejudice and society and marrying Robert Martin against Emma’s original advice. She has managed to think beyond social assumptions.

Harriet’s autonomy in marriage is made easier by the ambiguity surrounding her parents’ class, but she nonetheless chooses to reject the belonging offered by the Hartfield circle - a belonging which Mr. Knightley first worries ‘will only put her out of conceit with all the other places she belongs to. She will grow just refined enough to be uncomfortable with those among whom birth and circumstances have placed her home’161. Or more simply - as Knightley remarks of Emma’s portraiture - “‘You have made her too tall, Emma’”162. Like the Grams in Powder, Harriet has had the courage to abandon the need for affirmation from civilising influence, instead finding prospective belonging in the smaller group of a marriage to Robert Martin. When Harriet’s social origins are discovered, they serve to validate her actions; and although this fortunately salves the insecurities of Austen’s society, this validation ultimately seems redundant in the context of her self-determination.

157 id., p. 27.
158 id., p. 223.
159 id., p. 388.
160 id., p. 220.
161 id., p. 34.
Marriage and Love

Near the start of *Emma*, Emma declares that she has “‘very little intention of ever marrying at all’”\textsuperscript{163}, and Harriet too later mimics, “‘I shall never marry’”\textsuperscript{164}. However, by the end of the novel, the only spinster left is Miss Bates, whose ‘middle of life was devoted to the care of a failing mother’\textsuperscript{165}; and indeed, the author herself. Harriet heralds the socialising forces which will act upon them, “‘But still, you will be an old maid! and that’s so dreadful!’”\textsuperscript{166} and Emma is prepared to agree with her in as far as conceding that, “‘A single woman, with a very narrow income, must be a ridiculous, disagreeable old maid! the proper sport of boys and girls’”\textsuperscript{167}. As the couples are mooted around them, and Mr. Elton avoids the rueful absence of a dancing partner, by joining the social dance through marriage - “‘But my dancing days are over, Mrs. Weston’”\textsuperscript{168} - it seems that social ritual and expectation conspire against the single life. Emma feels threatened without knowing why when Mrs. Weston suspects that an attachment may be forming between Mr. Knightley and Jane Fairfax: “‘Mr. Knightley! - Mr. Knightley must not marry!’”\textsuperscript{169}. Emma is later galvanised by the possibility that Harriet has received encouragement from Knightley, but again Emma is prompted to constitute her emotions by a fear of losing him; rather than desiring to marry him because of her emotions: ‘It darted through her, with the speed of an arrow, that Mr. Knightley must
marry no one but herself!\textsuperscript{170}. The fickle volatility of Harriet’s infatuations when exposed to the force of suggestion, also subversively interrogates the socially conditioned notion of ‘falling in love’ - ‘it really was too much to hope even of Harriet, that she could be in love with more than \textit{three} men in one year’\textsuperscript{171}. In these ways, Austen subverts the discourses of love and love in marriage, but cannot avoid her characters being interpellated by anxieties about spinsterhood.

The Role of Guilt and Social Perception

Other ideological social assumptions are slightly harder to perceive and thus even to interrogate, they are more deeply interpellated. \textit{Emma} is written in an idiom which seems occasionally to be influenced by Biblical discourse. Emma’s condemnation of ‘“licentiousness of that woman’s tongue!”’\textsuperscript{172} perhaps stems from the anxiety towards the sinful tongue in James that ‘no man can tame the tongue. It is a restless evil, full of deadly poison’\textsuperscript{173}. The General Confession of the Anglican service of Holy Communion makes communicants ask repentance for sins committed in ‘thought, word and deed’\textsuperscript{174} and Emma chastises herself for even thinking about leaving her father: ‘She even wept over the idea of it, as a sin of thought’\textsuperscript{175}. We will come to observe Emma’s shame upon realising that she has been ‘remiss, perhaps, more in thought than fact; scornful, ungracious’\textsuperscript{176} and it seems that the Christian society of the early nineteenth century has instilled both in Jane Austen and in her characters the assumption that it is culpable to have bad thoughts. In Dryden’s

\textsuperscript{170}\textsuperscript{170}id., p. 335.  
\textsuperscript{171}\textsuperscript{171}id., p. 369.  
\textsuperscript{172}\textsuperscript{172}id., p. 233.  
\textsuperscript{173}\textsuperscript{173}The Holy Bible: New International Version, second edition, trans. and ed. by The Committee on Bible Translation, the International Bible Society (UK: Hodder and Stoughton, 1980), James 4: 8, p1215.  
\textsuperscript{174}\textsuperscript{174}Austen, \textit{Emma}, p. 407.  
\textsuperscript{175}\textsuperscript{175}id., p. 356.
Overcoming Guilt, the former psychotherapist writes about guilt and ‘how it applies to the seven deadly sins’. Dryden would advocate developing a more constructive attitude towards the guilt that Emma felt over her ‘sin of thought’. Thus, instead of believing ‘that you are a bad person for having such thoughts’ - the social position in Emma - ‘constructive remorse’ would effectively involve diminishing the subject’s sense of responsibility for their thoughts:

you believe that while it may be preferable for you not to have these thoughts, there is no law of the universe which states that, as a human, you absolutely must not have them ... you believe that you are a fallible human being rather than a bad person; you evaluate the thoughts, not yourself as a total human being.

Emma is unlikely to be able to ask of herself Dryden’s question, ‘Is this belief helpful?’, purely because scriptural beliefs are so deeply ingrained as an ideological truth in her culture. Characters who have reference groups wider than the parochial and claustrophobic community of Hartfield fare better than the static residents in their attempts to achieve autonomy from any considerable tyranny of the social perception ethos. Emma finds it hard to accept that Jane Fairfax displays “such apparent indifference whether she pleased or not” and is surprised by Frank Churchill’s decision to travel to London to have his haircut, ‘indifferent as to how his conduct might appear in general’. Faced with such a brazen and ‘undaunted’ nonconformity in Frank’s values, Emma can only moralise that “I do not know whether it ought to be so, but certainly silly things do cease to be silly if they are done by sensible people in an impudent way”. Whereas Mrs. Elton suffers from the fact

176 id., p. 311.
178 Austen, Emma, p. 356.
179 Dryden, Overcoming Guilt, p. 3. Also, subsequent two quotations.
180 id., p. 98.
181 Austen, Emma, p. 139.
182 id., p. 170.
183 id., p. 176.
that ‘all her notions were drawn from one set of people, and one style of living,’ Mr. Knightley is able to escape Highbury for London when he is troubled by Emma’s attentions to Frank on Box Hill: ‘He had gone to learn to be indifferent’.

Highbury’s ‘upper middle-class’ social circle is a group which promotes the vulnerability of its members to social perceptions of oneself, since inclusion and status within the group is justified partly by perceived gentility of manner and conduct. Mr. Knightley therefore finds it relatively easy to induce feelings of shame and guilt in Emma. The greatest blow to Emma’s confidence and faith in her own character comes after Mr. Knightley severely chastises her for her treatment of Miss Bates on Box Hill. Mr. Knightley sensitises Emma to guilt over her lack of compassion or sensitivity towards Miss Bates saying, ‘“Her situation should secure your compassion. It was badly done indeed! ... This is not pleasant to you, Emma - And it is very far from pleasant to me; but I must, I will, - I will tell you truths while I can”’.

In consequence, Emma begins to question how much of her behaviour is ‘open to any severe reproach’ and doubts her own worth as a daughter: ‘unmerited as might be the degree of his fond affection and confiding esteem’. Emma ‘never had been so depressed’ and calls to mind her past, believing that ‘She had been often remiss, her conscience told her so; remiss, perhaps, more in thought than in fact; scornful, ungracious’.

Despite the sincerity of the contrite guilt which Mr. Knightley has awakened in Emma, her behaviour has been far from malicious. Emma has made a flippant joke at the expense of Miss Bates, who has a tendency to inadvertently harass those around her with her endless vacuous monologues: Emma says, ‘“Ah! ma’am, but there may be a difficulty. Pardon me -

184 id., p. 223.
185 id., p. 355.
186 id., introduction, p. xiv.
187 id., p. 309.
188 id., p. 311.
189 id.
190 id., p. 310.
but you will be limited as to number - only three at once”\(^{192}\). Miss Bates’ manner of speaking is a nuisance and an irritation - Mr. Perry tactfully asides that he ‘very much feared’\(^{193}\) that Jane Fairfax’s nervous disorder ‘derived more evil than good’\(^{194}\) from the attentions of her aunt, who ‘he must acknowledge not to be the best companion for an invalid of that description’\(^{195}\). The substance of Emma’s jibe is not unsubstantiated, yet she is vulnerable to interpellation by the discourse of shame because her glib remark comes - in Knightley’s words - ‘in thoughtless spirits, and the pride of the moment’\(^{196}\). It is Emma’s lapse of self-control and conviction which puts her at the mercy of external validation; and this suggests again therefore, that to avoid the heteronomy of guilt mechanisms requires a subject to act - like James Love - out of conviction of will and an indifference to social perception.

Knightley’s Autonomous Resolve

There is a stark disparity between the community of *Powder*, where Guy deBurret lives out the philosophy that, “‘You don’t have to smile at any cunt, if you don’t feel like it”\(^{197}\) and the society of Highbury where ‘Some change of countenance was necessary for each gentleman as they walked into Mrs. Weston’s drawing-room; - Mr. Elton must compose his joyous looks, and Mr. John Knightley disperse his ill-humour. Mr. Elton must smile less, and Mr. John Knightley more, to fit them for the place’\(^{198}\). When Mrs. Elton attempts to ingratiate

\(^{191}\) id., p. 311.  
\(^{192}\) id., p. 306.  
\(^{193}\) id., pp. 320 - 321.  
\(^{194}\) id., p. 321.  
\(^{195}\) id., p. 320  
\(^{196}\) id., p. 309.  
\(^{197}\) Sampson, *Powder*, p. 422; see also p. 444.  
\(^{198}\) id., p. 98.
herself into Highbury society using informal abbreviations of people’s names, her manner is deemed over-familiar and vulgar. Even Frank Churchill, whose ‘indifference to a confusion of rank, bordered too much on inelegance of mind’\(^{199}\), is filled with ‘‘indignation and hatred ... ‘Jane,‘ indeed! ... with all the vulgarity of needless repetition, and all the insolence of imaginary superiority‘’\(^{200}\). Although she may continue to overbearingly impose herself upon others, it seems unlikely that she will be accepted into the group without adopting their aesthetic standards. The tenets of restraint and civility are intrinsic to belonging in this circle.

Yet Mr. Knightley appears to be a respected and integral member of this group who does not depend upon appeasing social perception to assure himself of his own judgement or justify his own belonging. Does Mr. Knightley therefore have an autonomous source of affirmation? Mr. Knightley does not pragmatically pander to the conceit of others; as he tells Mr. Woodhouse, ‘‘Emma knows I never flatter her‘’\(^{201}\). When Mrs. Weston provocatively taunts, ‘‘I am sure you always thought me unfit for the office I held‘’\(^{202}\), Knightley responds with defiant honesty: ‘‘Yes,“ said he, smiling\(^{203}\). Where Emma’s instinct is to mediate - ‘she dreaded being quarrelsome‘\(^{204}\) - Knightley is not afraid to confront others with his honest opinion: ‘‘Not Harriet’s equal!” exclaimed Mr. Knightley loudly and warmly\(^{205}\). Thus even in ardent nonconformity, Knightley shows restraint and civility. Although he admittedly has the advantage of acting from a secure and unquestionable position of enfranchised high social status, Knightley’s nonconformity is grounded in his conviction that restraint and civility do not need to extend to weakness of character and vacillation.

\(^{199}\)id., p. 165.
\(^{200}\)id., p. 362.
\(^{201}\)id., p. 11.
\(^{202}\)id., p. 33.
\(^{203}\)id.
\(^{204}\)id., p. 95.
\(^{205}\)id., p. 53.
Mr. Knightley advocates that Frank Churchill should have gone against the wishes of his guardians, Mr. and Mrs. Churchill, in upholding his duty to see his father: “‘not by manœvering and finessing, but by vigour and resolution’”206. In appealing to higher values than conciliatory expediency, Knightley can justify slighting the character of the popular Frank Churchill:

“Your amiable young man is a very weak young man, if this be the first occasion of his carrying though a resolution to do right against the will of others ... I can allow for the fears of the child, but not of the man. As he became rational, he ought to have roused himself and shaken off all that was unworthy in their authority.”207

By aspiring to be guided by the higher principles of honesty and duty, Knightley appears to sustain his convictions and his wider reputation, irrespective of criticism. Assailed by Mrs. Elton, Knightley stands firm. When Mrs. Elton presumes to invite guests to Donwell on his behalf, he ‘calmly’ but resolutely insists upon his prerogative208, and later he does not buckle to peer pressure to return to the Elton’s: “‘I thought he would come, because Mrs. Elton declared she would not let him off, he did not’”209. It matters little to him that Mrs. Elton considers him “‘a humourist, and may say what you like. Quite a humourist’”,210 and later begins to refer to him as “‘eccentric’”211, responding perhaps to his unique resilience to her dominant will, because Knightley is holding honestly to his principles and to his personality.

The Greek poet Pindar wrote ‘Become who you are’212 and Jung too saw a process of individuation as integral to ‘realisation of one’s wholeness’213, writing that ‘the development of the individual personality’ is ‘an extension of the sphere of consciousness, an enriching of

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206 id., p. 122.
207 id., p. 123.
208 id., p. 293.
209 id., p. 314.
210 id., p. 293.
211 id., p. 375.
213 id., p. 104.
conscious psychological life. When Knightley criticises Frank Churchill’s weakness of character, he sets out a system of behaviour in opposition which involves a stoic adherence to one’s principled will: “a resolution to do right against the will of others. It ought to have been a habit by this time, of following his duty, instead of consulting expediency. ... Had he begun as he ought, there would have been no difficulty now.” By the time Emma can see past superficial appearances, she recognises the genuine nature which Knightley has developed: ‘The intention, however, was indubitable; and whether it was that his manner had in general so little gallantry, or however else it happened, but she thought nothing became him more. - It was with him, of so simple, yet so dignified a nature.

Knightley finds independent autonomous affirmation in his own integrity, authenticity and consistency. Mario Jacoby’s analysis as expounded in Shame and the Origins of Self-Esteem: A Jungian Approach would probably interpret Knightley’s position as a healthy development of that individuality which ‘is every human being’s endowment and which it is psychotherapy’s mandate to promote if ‘the personality is artificially stunted when the process of its natural unfolding is arrested in some way’. Jacoby elaborates the link between individuation and autonomous validation:

Human beings are social creatures, even if they become less dependent on others for validation and self-esteem as they become more integrated and individuated. Having experienced this transformation, I will be more able to affirm my own nature ... greater self-confidence also means greater freedom in relation to others - whether they are real figures or figures of fantasy. In other words, old fixated interaction patterns can become more pliant and the threshold of shame more flexible. The shame-anxiety associated with how I am seen by others becomes less intense and interfering.

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214id., p. 103.
215Austen, Emma, p. 123.
216id., p. 318.
218id.
219id., p. 104.
By living a life of consistent integrity to higher principles, Knightley is able to develop himself and to become more like those ‘Independents’ in Asch’s 1951 psychology experiment\textsuperscript{220} who ‘were either entirely confident in the accuracy of their own judgements, or were emotionally affected but guided by a belief in individualism or in doing the task as directed (i.e. being accurate and correct)’\textsuperscript{221}.

\textbf{Conclusion}

In the face of ‘inchoate formlessness’\textsuperscript{222}, ideology imposes an order which we want to believe in. Nietzsche wrote of ‘metaphysics, morality, religion, science’ that they ‘merit consideration as various forms of lies: with their help one can have faith in life’\textsuperscript{223}. Literature too, may be added to Nietzsche’s list since - in Halm’s words, ‘Representation is part and parcel of an unending process of self-and-world definition and circumspection whose

\textsuperscript{220}Hogg and Vaughan, \textit{Social Psychology}, p. 213. See also Appendix I, Consequences of Nonconformity.

\textsuperscript{221}id.

\textsuperscript{222}Halm, \textit{Theatre and Ideology}, p. 9.

common name is “culture”\(^{224}\). Like the Knightley children, we relish the subjective validity of ideological fairy-tales and we tell ourselves stories. I would argue that we need ideology as we need language, in order to interpret the ‘irrepressible multiplicity of phenomena’\(^{225}\), and therefore we enact Althusser’s advice, interpreted from Pascal - ‘kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe’\(^{226}\).

It seems useful to regard autonomy as an awareness of and engagement with the struggles of dialogic ideologies, as each tries to assert the primacy of its authorial truth over us. Although it may not be possible to escape discourse, only to exchange one discourse for another, we can expediently deconstruct discourses which constrain our self-interest if we recognise that - as Greenspan interprets Blackburn - ‘the world in itself contains no moral facts against which we might measure our moral statements’\(^{227}\). David Hume wrote, ‘We cannot verify moral choices. They may be vindicated, but not validated’\(^{228}\) and Shakespeare’s Hamlet also argues that the world’s ‘ confines’\(^{229}\) are ideologically imposed, ‘Why, then ’tis none to you, for there is nothing either / good or bad but thinking makes it so. To me it is a prison’\(^{230}\).

Hamlet’s words imply that different ‘thinking’ could dissolve the walls of this prison.

If we refuse to conform to the prevalent consensus of a group’s ‘thinking’ then we risk being ridiculed, stigmatised or excluded and suffering self-doubt. In the most extreme cases, being deprived of a sense of belonging can liberate an individual’s identity irremediably, and like Muzzlehatch, Kurtz and Hamlet, they will be categorised as mad. Nonetheless it is possible to be like the ‘Independents’ of Asch’s experiment\(^{231}\) and stand steadfastly autonomous from

\(^{224}\)Halm, *Theatre and Ideology*, p. 9
\(^{225}\)id.
\(^{230}\)id.
\(^{231}\)Hogg and Vaughan, *Social Psychology*, p. 213. See also Appendix I, Consequences of Nonconformity.
the temptation to affirm and subjectively validate our truths through social comparison. Mr. Knightley in *Emma* represents an archetype for this mode of individuation, and Jacoby contends that such behaviour will - in time - foster a more autonomous relationship with subjectifying ideology.

In *Titus Alone*, the view of identity put forward is that people are defined by their past - ‘Their past which made them what they were and nothing else, moved with them, adding at each footfall a new accretion’\(^{232}\) - but the novel suggests hope that this sense of self can be internalised, so that it derives significance from memories and is not at the mercy of material signifiers: ‘He no longer had any need for home, for he carried his Gormenghast within him’\(^{233}\). Losing the flint heralds a process of greater autonomy of identity for Titus which ends with Cheeta inadvertently disenchanting him of his craving for the source reality of Gormenghast. *Titus Alone* illustrates the manner by which surveillance induces the identity and subjectivity of a ‘good citizen’, and demonstrates how law and order impose the nation state’s authorial truth and identification upon its subjects; a categorisation which is liable to infiltrate their identity.

*Powder*’s James Love - a modern-day Kurtz figure - exhibits an autonomy of moral affirmation uncommonly based on an oblivious rejection of the discourses of shame and guilt. The common tendency of identification with an ingroup is towards a conformity of values with its members and James Love finds belonging in a group for which transgression is a tenet. Irrespective of this he nonetheless conscientiously ignores any group perceptions of his behaviour, actively subverting expectations and pre-empting shame. Where Knightley gains self-affirmation from holding consistently to ‘“a resolution to do right against the will of others”’\(^{234}\), James Love pursues a hedonistic heterodox and finds himself ‘“beyond the

\(^{233}\)id., p. 262 - 263.
bounds of permitted aspirations” and thereby beyond interpellation. For James Love, contact with the heterodox has deprived inclusive discourse of its credibility.

Emma is strongly interpellated by class prejudice in her approach to manners and marriage, whereas Harriet eventually manages to follow her own will autonomously of both of these social assumptions; and Mr Knightley judges people by their merit, expressing dissatisfaction with the class system. Certain group discourses are integral to belonging within the group and can rarely be deconstructed whilst retaining belonging. Harriet marries outside the prevailing prejudices and so is ostracised from Hartfield; and Mrs. Elton will not be fully accepted amongst Emma’s circle unless she conforms to the group’s norms of formal appellation.

Some dialectically opposed ideological positions cannot easily even be conceived from within the context of group belonging. Emma is unlikely to question whether sinful thought is culpable, and for Titus Groan of Gormenghast, once he has seen the ‘Thing’, he inevitably finds it hard to derive a fulfilled sense of belonging from his home henceforth: ‘She had shown him by her independence how it was only fear that held people together. The fear of being alone and the fear of being different. Her unearthly arrogance and self-sufficiency had exploded at the very centre of his conventions’.

As Jacoby’s perspective on individuation suggests, autonomy necessitates a strong self-esteem in the subject because it requires that they have faith in their own self-knowledge, perception, and judgements; and confidence enough to act upon this conviction in the face of doubt or opposition. In the context of conflicting ideologies, these texts have shown how it is evidently easier to act autonomously if one has affirmation from other diverse or inclusive reference groups, such as the wider circles of the less settled Highbury residents, or James Love’s entourage. Furthermore, an individual’s capacity to act autonomously is promoted in these texts, if that individual’s identity, self-esteem and therefore confidence of judgement, is
founded in inviolable or hermetic principles. This is illustrated by Mr. Knightley’s self-affirmative way, based on consistently honest behaviour; by Titus’ internalised identification with sacrosanct memories of his background; and by James Love’s ethos of obliviously pursuing hedonistic heterodoxy. Autonomy is evidently constrained when an individual’s identity is mastered by a consciousness of other’s perceptions of themselves, by material and visual codifiers, or by a fear of exclusion.

The portrayed consequences of autonomy range from the liberating disenfranchisement of Muzzlehatch or the isolation of Conrad’s Kurtz, who “‘knew no restraint, no faith and no fear’”237, to an autonomy like Harriet’s or James Love’s, in which the subjects realise a more effective pursuit of their self-interest - in both cases forsaking wider affirmation for the belonging offered by an inclusive group. Autonomy from conformity and group identity may ideally promote a Jungian ‘development of the individual personality’ as with Knightley, or a more effective pursuit of self-interest, as the Grams’ bassist Tony Snow delineates:

“‘Might find its a good way of going forward, though, you know. If you really don’t give a fuck any more, that’s the best possible way to approach your job. There’s no fear. You’re not fucking dependent on it, not dependent on success, nothing. You don’t have to smile at any cunt, if you don’t feel like it.”238

236 Peake, Gormenghast, pp. 506 - 507.
237 Conrad, Heart of Darkness, p. 66.
238 Sampson, Powder, p. 422; see also p. 444.
Appendix I: Social-Psychological Terms

Social psychology provides us with a framework of analytical terms and concepts. People conform because they are ‘reinforced’ if they do. Furthermore, people conform because of ‘social comparison’. As Bleda and Castore observed, we may find it difficult not to change in the direction of conformity because ‘We commonly compare ourselves with others, especially those who are like us, as a way of assessing the accuracy of our attitudes, feelings, and beliefs. We like to view ourselves as rational and correct in our views’. If our own perception of ‘the accuracy of our attitudes, feelings, and beliefs’ is contingent upon our conformity to the ‘social norms’ of our ‘reference groups’ - ‘people we are like, or wish to be like’ - the implications for our autonomy of thought and action are disturbing. Internally, the

240 *id.*
242 Dworetzky, *Psychology*, p. 533. Also, subsequent three quotations.
non-conforming individual is likely to undergo self-doubt, externally, they are likely to feel threatened by the possibility of exclusion.

Categorising Influences of Conformity

Social psychologists have categorised the group influence towards conformity in three ways. ‘Informational influence’ is a process by which other group members’ perceptions are depended upon - as in Muzaffer Sherif’s 1936 autokinesis experiment\(^{243}\) - for ‘information that disambiguates reality and thus establishes a subjective validity’\(^{244}\). Althusser defines ideology as ‘a “representation” of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence’\(^{245}\); and I would argue that this is what is being offered to us by the ‘subjective validity’ of the ideological representations our reference groups provide. Halm describes representation thus:

> Representation is part and parcel of an unending process of self-and-world definition and circumspection whose common name is “culture”. In all human experience, always, everywhere, a formal order is and needs to be imposed on the inchoate formlessness and irrepressible multiplicity of phenomena\(^{246}\).

I believe this imposed order to be the ideological undertow of what psychologists term informational influence, wherein - as Sherif supposed - ‘people use the behaviour of others to establish the range of possible behaviours’\(^{247}\) and as Hogg and Vaughan relate, ‘Average, central or middle positions in such frames of reference are perceived to be more correct than fringe positions, and thus people tend to adopt them’\(^{248}\).

‘Normative influence’ operates when the subject is under surveillance by the group and it motivates the subject to conform for the sake of ‘social approval and acceptance’. Unlike informational influence, normative influence tends to ‘[create] surface compliance rather than true cognitive change’\(^{249}\). Charles and Sara Kiesler comment that ‘We apparently think that if we act somewhat like others, they will like us more. Some research on ingratiation suggests

\(^{243}\)Hogg and Vaughan, Social Psychology, p. 212.
\(^{244}\)Id., p. 220.
\(^{246}\)Halm, Theatre and Ideology, p. 9.
\(^{247}\)Hogg and Vaughan, Social Psychology, p. 211.
\(^{248}\)Id.
\(^{249}\)Id., p. 220.
that people implicitly assume this to be true, even though they may not be able to describe their feeling explicitly.\footnote{250}{Charles A. Kiesler and Sara B. Kiesler, \textit{Conformity}, first edition, (USA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 42 - 43.}

The third categorisation of group influence was developed in response to a perceived under-emphasis in the earlier models upon ‘the role of group “belongingness”’\footnote{251}{Hogg and Vaughan, \textit{Social Psychology}, p. 220. Also, subsequent five quotations.} in influencing subjects. Thus ‘referent informational influence’ theorises that individuals conform to what they believe to be the group norms - of the group which they categorise themselves as belonging to. Self-categorisation theorists believe that members of the same social group internalise a relevant group norm ‘to describe and prescribe the group’s behaviour’. ‘Psychological group belongingness’ results from this feedback-loop of identification, as ‘self-categorisation produces intragroup convergence on that norm’ and ‘Because the norm is an internalised representation, people can conform to it in the absence of surveillance’. Referent informational influence tends to accentuate perceived differences between the ingroup and outgroup members.

\textbf{Consequences of Nonconformity}

In Asch’s 1951 psychological investigation, the object of judgement was unambiguous. Subjects were presented with three lines on a card and asked to call out which of these was the same as the standard line before them. This was undertaken in a group with seven to nine other people, who the subject believed were ordinary participants like himself, but who were actually experimental confederates instructed to be unanimous in each of their erroneous judgements. Only 25 per cent participants managed to remain steadfastly autonomous in their responses to twelve tests:

They all reported initially experiencing uncertainty and self-doubt as a consequence of the disagreement between themselves and the group, which gradually evolved into self-consciousness, fear of disapproval and feelings of anxiety, and even loneliness. Different reasons were given for yielding. The majority knew they saw things differently from the group, but felt their perceptions may have been inaccurate and that the group was actually correct. Others did not believe the group was correct but simply went along with the group in order not to stand out. A small minority reported that they actually saw the lines as the group did.\footnote{252}{}

Self-doubt is therefore one of the possible psychological repercussions of not conforming, and another is a fear of exclusion. In her study of bullying in Scandinavia, Elaine Munthe
refers to ‘psychological violence’\textsuperscript{253} in ‘the use of exclusion’\textsuperscript{254}, and Hogg and Vaughan surmise from the above responses that one reason why people conform may be ‘to avoid censure, ridicule and social disapproval. This is a real fear’\textsuperscript{255}. In another version of this experiment, Asch planted only one confederate amongst sixteen naïve participants. He was ‘openly ridiculed and laughed at’\textsuperscript{256} for his incorrect answers. Dworetzky concludes as follows:

Someone who is very different from the other members of a group may make the group feel uncomfortable because he or she will disrupt the group’s stable basis for comparison. The group will usually try to force the individual to change. If it fails, the person who is viewed a deviant may be rejected.\textsuperscript{257}

**Appendix II: Anthropology - ‘Shame Cultures’ and ‘Guilt Cultures’**

The moral autonomy of an individual is usually confined and socialised along moral lines by the socially indoctrinated mechanisms of guilt and shame. Freud wrote of the importance of the ‘sense of guilt’\textsuperscript{258} for the evolution of culture; and in Jacoby’s Jungian approach to *Shame and the Origins of Self-Esteem*, he writes: ‘For any society, it is important to keep unbridled instinctuality in check and to redirect sexuality into civilized channels’\textsuperscript{259}. In anthropological and psychoanalytical studies of cultures, it was ‘practically axiomatic to classify them into shame cultures and guilt cultures’\textsuperscript{260} according to Piers and Singer.

Eberhard contests this categorisation between internal and external socialising influences and

\textsuperscript{252} Id., p. 213.
\textsuperscript{254} Id.
\textsuperscript{255} Hogg and Vaughan, *Social Psychology*, p. 213.
\textsuperscript{256} Id.
\textsuperscript{257} Dworetzky, *Psychology*, p. 533.
Ayling acknowledges that ‘there are hardly any pure “shame” or pure “guilt” cultures’\(^{261}\).

Nevertheless, it is instructive to analyse how the traditional anthropological classifications of shame cultures and guilt cultures might be related to the privileging of particular social-psychological categories of group influence. In shame cultures, what others think of you is very important in defining what you ‘ought not’\(^{262}\) to do. The operation of shame can be allied to normative influence; its Indo-Germanic root - ‘\textit{kam/kem}’ meaning “to cover”\(^{263}\) - suggesting a response to external surveillance of the self. I would support this postulatory link with the example of Chinese society where ‘to lose face’ (\textit{shih-lien})\(^{264}\) is by implication also to lose that ‘lien’ which refers to ‘personal integrity, good character, and the confidence of society and of oneself in one’s ability to play one’s social role’\(^{265}\).

In contrast to this external sanction, in guilt cultures children are socialised by ‘sensitizing them to the feeling of guilt’\(^{266}\), thereby internalising responsibility to cultural norms, as ‘conscience’\(^{267}\). Muzafar and Carolyn Sherif relate guilt - and its internalised influence towards conformity - back to the idea of reference groups, privileging the role of relevant others in enforcing interpellation. With reference to adolescents, their writings imply that guilt operates within the confines of referent informational influence and this helps to explain its limitations:

an individual may know perfectly well what his parents, teachers, and preacher say is right and wrong, and yet violate this without feelings of guilt if his fellows do not condemn him. The term ‘conscience’ ceases to be useful as a \textit{psychological} concept when applied only to those prescriptions which adult and legal authority uphold. It becomes psychologically meaningful.


\(^{261}\) Eberhard, \textit{Guilt and Sin}, p. 3.

\(^{262}\) id., p. 2.


\(^{264}\) Eberhard, \textit{Guilt and Sin}, p. 4.

\(^{265}\) id.

\(^{266}\) id., p. 2.

\(^{267}\) Piers and Singer, \textit{Shame and Guilt}, p. 59.
when used to refer to those standards which the individual ... does experience remorse when he violates ... Such standards are those of his reference groups ... .

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